gr8fuldaniel: 05/01/2005 - 05/08/2005

gr8fuldaniel

Rantings, Musings, Observations, Political Protest, My findings in a quest for truth posted here, open to all. Comments have been disabled due to spam bombers. Pray4Peace.

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Saturday, May 07, 2005

The Iraq WarThe unpublished "faces of war". Not for the squemish, but before you vote for somebody like Bush, you owe it to fellow human beings to see whats really going on in this "sterile war". It is hidden from us so we will more readily accept these wars for profit. Nobody had to die. Its all about a lie.

Wednesday, May 04, 2005

The secret Downing Street memo - Sunday Times - Times Online: "The secret Downing Street memo



SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY


DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US op"

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